Download Citation on ResearchGate | Content and Self-Knowledge | La these Pastist externalists (e.g., Boghossian ; Burge ) maintain that the past. Volume 17, Issue 1, Spring Philosophy of Mind. Paul A. Boghossian. Pages DOI: /philtopics Content and Self-Knowledge. Content and Self-Knowledge. Paul A. Boghossian University of Michigan. INTRODUCTION I. This paper argues that, given a certain apparently inevitable thesis.

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Take an overtly circular argument which concludes 3 using 3 as a premise. Sign in to use this feature. The question whether this conflict is real is what drives the contemporary debate on externalism and self-knowledge.

Externalism and Self-Knowledge (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

From the Publisher via CrossRef no proxy pao. Besides Burge, self-verifying judgments were touted around the same time by Davidson ; and Heil ;though others have subsequently embraced them as well e. It is in that sense that the judgment is self-fulfilling or self-verifying. But for a rebuttal, see Brueckner Still, why does this reveal a problem with our self-knowledge? But the argument does not transmit warrant to its conclusion; it cannot bestow any warrant on 3 that was not already there.

The difference between transmission and warrant closure is best seen in cases of question begging. It is clear, however, that W. For instance, several theories say in short that a concept [ 5 ] has its content in virtue of certain causal relations the concept bears to an environmental referent DretskeMillikan ;Fodor ; ; also, cf.

Jacob once expressed this well as follows: Where t 2 is a time after a slow switch, and t 1 is a time before, then: Ebbs,Debating Self-KnowledgeCambridge: For one can imagine cases where slow switching is a relevant alternative. Yet the foremost arguments for the view are not so parochial. Open access to the SEP is made possible by a world-wide funding initiative.


For instance, suppose the skeptic challenges Oscar on whether he knows the truth of anything with certainty. Science Logic and Mathematics.

This paper argues that, given a certain apparently inevitable thesis about content, we could not know our own minds. Cambridge University Press, pp. Request removal from index.

Externalism and Self-Knowledge

Therefore, it applies to the utterance as it occurs in the consequent of II. But this does not yet imply that interacting with water is the only way that someone can arrive at water thoughts.

In addition, new issues have arisen in light of externalism about qualia as held by Lycan ; ;DretskeTye A rather different line against SK derives from an externalist view about concept possession. A popular answer comes from the epistemic contextualists DeRose ;Lewis ; see also the entry on epistemic contextualism.

Mirror Sites View this site from another server: Similarly, some compatibilists regard slow switching as a bizarre skeptical possibility which makes exceedingly high the evidential standards for knowledge Hohwy ; Neta is also pertinent.

An Essay on Self-KnowledgePrinceton: Note here that, if the deduction fails to prove the conclusion, this does not mean it transmits no warrant at all.

In section 4, we will end with some lesser-known issues for externalist self-knowledge. The debate on whether EXT is unrestrictedly true is important, but this is not the place to discuss it. The environment would play a part as well. But for replies, see Korman and Parent a,ch.

Paul Boghossian, Content and self-knowledge – PhilPapers

Volume 10Boston: Further, some writers have worried that if one can know what one thinks, then one can know that one thinks. Trivially, anyone warranted in believing the premise is warranted in believing the conclusion.


Even so, there are two arguments in the literature suggesting that any externalist view of empty concepts must fail Boghossian ;SegalBesson Philosophical PapersNew York: Externalism about Empty Concepts 2.

Toward making this clearer, suppose that Oscar is informed of the switches at some later time t 3.

Content and Self-Knowledge in Philosophy of Mind

Yet in light of his resistance, Boghossian formulates a different version of the slow switch argument. Request removal from index. But this may not be a huge concession, since one may remain capable of knowing a self-verifying judgment that W from the armchair, absent any comparisons with twin contents. For it seems that II can be shown true, no matter whether the skeptic speaks English or Twin English.

If the thought experiments are right about this, then internal states do not wholly determine thought content. For even though memory xontent up a similar substitute content, it seems clear that Oscar fails to recall something about water.

QED Let us now consider some objections to transmission failure. And if Dry Contenf is not referring to water, then as before, the Frege-Carnap view implies that his concept has a different intension or content. For instance, suppose Oscar knows he is driving through a countryside with at least one barn, but some defeating condition is introduced e.